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Abstract
　This paper intends to investigate whether the Raskin program aﬀects the expenditure of 
households in Indonesia, especially with respect to education and health expenditure. Using 
the cross-sectional data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey 4 and employing the 
propensity score matching method and the two stage least square method, the study ﬁnds 
that the Raskin program aﬀects education expenditures, whereas there is no evidence that 
the program aﬀects health expenditures of beneﬁciaries.
　The study also investigates the household and demographic characteristics as 
determinants of education and health expenditures. The paper ﬁnds that, in general, 
household and demographic characteristics play a signiﬁcant role in education and health 
expenditures.
　Based on the estimated results the paper suggests that the government should keep 
implementing the program with some points. First, the government and Non-Government 
Organization （NGO） should enhance and monitor the targeting program. Second, the 
government could provide some programs that generate and create income, such as 
workplace, loans, or health insurance to the poor households. In addition, in order to avoid 
becoming a burden that the government supports, the government should sustain economic 
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growth that can create employment and better income to skillful and healthy workers.
Key words :  Raskin program, poverty alleviation, propensity score matching method, the 
two stage least square （2SLS）
１．Introduction
　Many developing countries have implemented various programs to alleviate poverty. 
Usually the programs involved developed countries or international agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund （IMF）, the World Bank （WB）, the Asian Development Bank 
（ADB）, and many more as fund sponsors. Yet, not all these eﬀorts have fulﬁlled 
expectations. As a result, income inequality remains high.
　The government of Indonesia had one famous program implemented for poor people 
called Raskin （Rice for the Poor）. This program was implemented for more than ten years, 
since the Asian Financial crisis aﬀected the Indonesian economy in 1998. The main aim of 
the program was to support food for the needy households. It was expected that the 
program would be able to decrease income inequality.
　The program provided subsidized rice at price 1,000 rupiah
1）
 per kilogram for each 
beneﬁciary. All beneﬁciaries were supposed to receive 20 kilogram of subsidized rice every 
month for one year. From 1998 until 2007, the price paid by beneﬁciaries was ﬁxed ; 
therefore, the main purpose of the program was food adequacy ﬁrst, but also aided income 
transfer as well. In other words, this program became a combination of income transfer 
and food adequacy aid. Therefore, it is interesting to know how participants allocate their 
additional income to certain expenditures.
　Meanwhile, the previous studies suggested that education and health played a big role in 
human development quality. They suggested that better education and health lead to a 
better economic life （Card, 1999 ; Tilak, 2002）. This means that a better level of education 
and health will secure better jobs and income and in the end raise the economic status of 
the individual.
　The United Nation Development （UNDP） stated that the expected and mean years of 
schooling in Indonesia were increasing slightly from 1980 to 2006. In addition, the literacy 
rate above 10 years old increased from 61 percent in 1971 to 93 percent in 2007
2）
.
　Accordingly, the Central Statistics Bureau （BPS） stated that from 2000 until 2007 the 
nominal and the percentage share of education expenditures either in urban or rural areas 
had a trend towards increasing. We discovered a similar trend to the nominal and the 
percentage share of the health expenditures in both areas
3）
.
　The information above suggests that the enrolled students and the increased health 
indicator indicated that the households needed more money to pay for both expenditures. 
In other words, the expenditures on education and health should have increased as the 
children could aﬀord higher levels of education and health.
　Considering these conditions, this paper attempts to analyze how additional income 
（　　）
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induced the participants of the program to change their share of expenditure on education 
and health by using propensity score matching （PSM） and the two stage least square 
（2SLS） method.
　The remainder of this study is structured as follows : Section 2 provides information on 
the Raskin program, the education and health in Indonesia. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical and reviews of some selected empirical literatures. Section 4 procures the data 
and methodology applied in this study. Section 5 is empirical analysis and discussion. The 
ﬁnal section is the conclusion with some policy implications
２．The Raskin Program, Education and Health Issue in Indonesia
２―１　An Overview of the Raskin Program
　Raskin （Beras untuk Masyarakat Miskin）, literally meaning rice for the poor, was a 
program by the Indonesian Government that intended to reduce the ﬁnancial burden of 
poor households and to maintain the improvement of food adequacy needed by providing 
subsidized rice.
　This targeted program was a transformation of the Special Market Operation, （Operasi 
Pasar Khusus / OPK）, which was part of the Social Safety Net （SSN） when the Asian 
Financial Crisis hit Indonesia in 1998. A poor household deﬁnition used in OPK program 
was based on classiﬁcation introduced by the National Family Planning Board （Badan 
Kesejahteraan Keluarga Berencana Nasional / BKKBN）. They were pra-sejahtera （pre-
prosperous）, Keluarga Sejahtera II or KS II （prosperous level I） which is almost poor, KS 
III and KS IV. The beneﬁciaries of the program were households in the ﬁrst two 
classiﬁcations. The village oﬃcial had the list of the beneﬁciaries based on this classiﬁcation, 
i. e., the ﬁrst two classiﬁcations, where the households bought the rice from the National 
Logistic Agency （the BULOG）. Then all beneﬁciaries bought the rice from the village 
oﬃcial at a price of 1,000 rupiah plus some amount of additional transportation cost.
　Hastuti et. al （2007） found that there were some weaknesses in targeting the 
beneﬁciaries and implementation of the OPK program. They revealed that measuring the 
poverty based on the consumption had less correlation with classiﬁcation of poor 
households introduced by the BKKBN. Therefore, the program had underestimated the 
targeted households by a signiﬁcant number. The poor households’ classiﬁcations were 
mainly for the contraceptive user purpose. In addition, the classiﬁcation was updated only 
once a year, so the dynamics of the households’ conditions could not be recorded. Most 
importantly, the classiﬁcation was based on the static criteria such as having clothes and 
housing conditions rather than the current welfare situation.
　Under these conditions, the government transformed the OPK program into Raskin, rice 
for the poor family, with some adjustments such as the concept, the implementation, and 
the source of the data to target the beneﬁciaries, distribution frequency, and designation of 
the institution assisting the local agents.
（　　）
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２―２　The Beneﬁciaries of the Raskin Program
　After transforming the program from OPK to Raskin, the method of targeting changed 
drastically. The beneﬁciaries of the program were poor households classiﬁed into very poor 
and poor. These poor households were selected by referring to data from SUSENAS 2005 
（National Socio-Economic Survey） conducted by the BPS. The BPS measures poverty by 
using basic needs consumption fulﬁllment. The poverty threshold referred to the total 
value of food expenditures to aﬀord a daily minimum of 2,100 kilocalories and non-food 
expenditures such as clothing, schooling, transportation and other individual basic needs 
reported by families. Those families with per capita expenditures below this poverty line 
are categorized as poor. All of these poor families were supposed to participate in the 
program. In fact, the implementation was weak because the program did not cover all of 
them.
　Furthermore, the government relaxed the rule that provided a possibility for a family 
categorized as almost poor to become a beneﬁciary. Through the village forum decision 
（musyawarah desa / mudes）, the village head decided which of these poor and almost poor 
households were to become participants. Once a year before the rice distributed, the 
village forum arranged a meeting. This meeting resulted in the list of beneﬁciaries of each 
village. The sub-district head approved the result and forwarded the ﬁnal list to the higher 
levels until reached the province level. The BULOG, who was in charge of supplying the 
rice, referred to the list in distributing the rice until the local distribution point at the 
price of 1,000 rupiah per kilogram. Moreover, the beneﬁciaries should pay for the rice in 
cash to the local distribution agent directly or transmit the money to the BULOG’s account 
before receiving the rice
4）
. This became one of the weaknesses of the program since not all 
poor households had cash.
　The government implemented this program based on the households’ condition and 
characteristics with no diﬀerentiation between regional poverty conditions. This was 
because the poor households were spread evenly throughout all regions.
　Table. 1 shows that the number of targeted households was increasing year by year, but 
still below the total poor households based on the SUSENAS data. Contrary to that, the 
amount of rice allocated decreased from 2.34 tons to 1.89 tons. This was because the 
（　　）
Table 1.　The Number of Targeted Households and the Amount of Rice Distributed （thousands）
Year Number of Poor Households
Number of Tar-
geted Households
％ of Targeted 
Households
Number of Rice 
Allocated （tons）
Budget Allocation 
（billion rp）
2002 15,136 9,790 64.68 2,350 4,230
2003 15,747 8,580 54.49 2,059 4,830
2004 15,747 8,591 54.56 2,062 4,830
2005 15,792 8,300 52.56 1,992 4,680
2006 15,503 10,830 69.86 1,625 6,630
2007 19,101 15,800 82.72 1,896 6,971
Source : BULOG
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government reduced the amount of rice distributed from 20 kg per month in 2005 to only 
10 kg in 2006.
　Moreover, the purchase price in 2007 was 4,616 rupiah per kilogram. This indicated that 
the government allocated the subsidy around 3,616 rupiah per kilogram
5）
. In addition, the 
subsidized price of the rice included the transportation cost up to the point of distribution 
and other administration fees such as oﬃcial bonuses and honorariums. Therefore, the 
beneﬁciaries did not need to pay any additional money to get the rice.
２―３　Education Issue in Indonesia
　There are three basic level of education in Indonesia : elementary, junior, and senior high 
level. The advanced level is college, while playgroup or kindergarten is not a compulsory. 
The length of time spent at the elementary level is six years, whereas for each of the 
junior or senior level is three years. The usual age for a child to begin elementary school 
is seven years old.
　Indonesia started a nine-year compulsory education in 1994
6）
. The government provides 
facilities such as public schools and rules related to school administration while the 
households utilize those facilities.
　Table 2 shows the number of enrolled students for each level of education from 2002 to 
2007 in Indonesia. The elementary level still dominates the composition of schoolchildren. 
For each year, the number of enrollment at the junior level was half of the total 
elementary children. This indicated that the rate of students dropping out or the amount 
of students that could not aﬀord the higher level was signiﬁcant. It was similar to other 
higher levels of education where the enrolled students decreased by almost half as the 
level of education increased.
　Furthermore, the number of enrolled students tended to increase from year to year for 
all levels of education. On the other hand, the enrolled students at the elementary and 
junior level tend to decline compared to the previous year.
２―４　Health Development in Indonesia
　In 1999, Law Number 22 on Regional Government was enacted. This law was revised in 
2004 through Law Number 32. This law ruled the government system from centralized to 
（　　）
Table 2.　The Enrollment Students by Level of Education （thousands）
Level of
Education 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Playgroup 1,846 1,986 2,179 3,143 3,724 3,584
Elementary 29,051 29,100 29,150 28,983 29,797 29,498
Junior High 9,931 9,605 9,682 10,287 11,503 10,961
Senior High 5,942 6,126 6,311 6,511 7,214 7,353
College 3,350 3,740 3,534 3,612 3,705 4,325
source : Ministry of Education
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regional autonomy at the district or municipality level. The law gave the provincial 
government more authority to manage local aﬀairs except for national defense, monetary 
and ﬁscal matters, religion, foreign aﬀairs, and justice.
　Following the law, the Ministry of Health stipulated that the goal of health programs 
and development after Health Law Number 23/1992 was enacted. This law became the 
basis of health department to provide public health services and activities at the local 
government level.
　The Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey in 2007 revealed that most of Indonesian 
people cited income as the main barrier to receiving better health service or treatment. 
This barrier was followed by distance to public health care, transportation, and unemployed 
spouse. Therefore, the Indonesian government provided aﬀordable health services through 
some health programs for the poor such as Social Security for the Poor, Health Fund, and 
Poor Health Card （Kartu Sehat）. Even though there are many pro poor programs in the 
health sector, studies revealed that the private spending on health still dominated health 
expenditures in Indonesia.
　Moreover, Figure 1 explains that the government only spent 36.6 percent of total health 
expenditures, whereas the private share was 63.4 percent. From the 63.4 percent of 
private expenditure, 76.1 percent was out of pocket, while 5.1 percent was pre-paid and 
the rest was from other sources. This indicates that households still have to share more of 
their income on health expenditures
7）
.
３．Theoretical Framework
　Sumarto, Suryahadi and Widiyanti （2004） suggested that this program has become a 
combination of income transfer and food adequacy aid because the price of subsidized rice 
was always constant and the amount was still below the total consumption. In order to 
（　　）
Figure 1.　The Share of Public and Private Health Expenditure
Source : BPS
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investigate the program contribution to the expenditure of households, we treat the 
program as additional income of the beneﬁciaries.
　The utility function of a household’s expenditure in Figure 2 explains that by assuming 
the education and health expenditure are normal goods, a beneﬁciary would increase their 
expenditure on both goods if they beneﬁt from the program. The beneﬁciary takes this 
action in order to receive the same level of utility maximization. Therefore, the utility 
maximization shifts from U1 to U2 when there is additional income.
３―１　Conceptual Framework and the Empirical Model
　Parents invest in education and health because these two factors are so important for a 
child’s future economic capabilities. Many studies are concerned about the determinants of 
household education and health. The household production model introduced by Becker （as 
cited in Sackey, 2007） has been improved and often used to analyze the determinants of 
human capital building of households. The function is dependent on households and 
community characteristics. The household production function implies that parents may 
maximize their resources in order to produce the highest quality of their children. This 
maximization is obtained through the combination of time and goods.
　One main determinant of education and health expenditure is household income. The 
International Labor Organization deﬁnes household income as the total income, whether 
any member of the household annually or regularly receives income in cash, in kind, or in 
services. The income does not include the gains from windfalls and other irregular or a 
one-time receipt. Ordinarily the household income is for current consumption, which does 
not decrease the value of the household’s net worth or all the disposal of the household’s 
ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial assets, nor does it increase the liabilities of the household.
　Chen （1990）, Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey （1999）, and Donaldson （2001） suggested that 
the theoretical and conceptual approach should be modiﬁed with the households and socio 
demographic characteristics as control variables to analyze a program’s impact （Figure 3）. 
（　　）
Figure 2.　The Eﬀect of Changes in Income
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Therefore, the empirical household production function has to be modiﬁed with program 
evaluation to examine the outcome estimation, which is given by :
　　　　Outcome＝f（Y, C）
where Y is income of a household and C is a set of household and demographic 
characteristics. Considering that the program is additional income to the participants, we 
do not use income as an independent variable instead of the program itself.
　The set of characteristics includes the age of the family’s head and family size. We also 
include some dummy variables such as gender, marital status and working status of the 
household’s head, level of education in both the head and spouse of the household （Card, 
1999 ; Tansel, 1998 ; Tilak, 2002 ; Thomas, 1994 ; Parker, Susan, and Wong, 1997）. Urban as a 
demographic dummy variable is also included in this study.
３―２　Literature Reviews
　Following the theoretical framework above, many studies have analyzed how a program 
is treated as additional income, which aﬀects the consumption of beneﬁciaries. Those 
programs were provided either in cash or in kind transfer.
　Houdinott and Skouﬁas （2003） analyzed how Progresa in Mexico, a targeted program to 
the mother of families from November 1998 to November 1999, aﬀected the food 
consumption of participants. This program provided both cash and in kind transfer. The 
former transfer linked to children’s enrollment and school attendance, while the latter 
included health beneﬁts such as nutrition for children, pregnant women, and lactating 
women. The study exploited longitudinal data （ENCEL） of 24,000 households located in 
506 localities of seven states. Three hundred and twenty of the localities are designated as 
treatment and the rest are as control communities.
　By a ﬁxed eﬀect of OLS method, the paper analyzed the impact of the program on 
caloric acquisition. The method also used some dummy variables to specify households 
（　　）
Figure 3.　Conceptual Frameworks of Program Analyses
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located in treatment or control localities and participants or non-participants. The result 
showed an increasing magnitude in the acquisition of fruits and vegetables consumption 
compare to grains and other food types. Further analysis is observed by including the 
eligible households that did not receive any transfer due to some reasons. Even though the 
results are signiﬁcant, they are still lower than the ﬁrst observation. Most importantly, the 
program encourages the beneﬁciaries to consume a varied diet such as fruits, animal 
product, milk, and others. Overall, this study suggests that eﬀorts to reduce poverty in the 
developing world will also reduce hunger.
　Attanasio and Menard （2006） analyzed the impact of the Familias en Accion on 
household consumption and its components in Colombia. The three main components of 
this program are health, education, and nutrition. This targeted program designated the 
poorest 20 percent of households in selected areas of Colombia.
　The program gave beneﬁciaries a “nutrition component” worth 40,000 pesos （around 
US$15） if a household had children aged 0 to 5. In addition, a mother also would receive 
14,000 pesos （US$5.5） and 28,000 pesos （US$11） if their children were enrolled and 
regularly attending primary or secondary school. Not all households received the beneﬁt 
regularly.
　The randomized assignment program used quasi-experimental approach with a diﬀerence 
in diﬀerence method. A repeated survey before the program in 2002 and after the program 
in 2003 made this method applicable. Twenty-ﬁve stratiﬁed control groups determined by 
region and index relating to health and education were constructed. As a result, the 
treatment group consisted of 57 municipalities while counterpart group consisted of 65 
municipalities. Due to political pressure, one of the groups had already received the 
program before the survey data were collected. Following this condition, the treatment 
group became two groups.
　The study argued that the total consumption increased around 15 percent as much as 
the food consumption. In particular, the increasing share of food consumption was 
concentrated in proteins such as milk, egg, and meat. In addition, the share of children’s 
clothing and education also increased, but not for adult goods such as alcohol, tobacco, and 
adult clothing.
　Another study on Latin countries is Red de Proteccion Social （RPS） in Nicaragua. The 
Nicaraguan RPS is a program that pays households cash stipends in exchange for school 
attendance and regular visits to health clinics by the children. Mallucio and Flores （2005） 
analyzed the heterogeneous impacts of the program on the poor people in Nicaragua. The 
advantage of this study is that the program was designated randomly. Therefore, the 
experimental study with a double diﬀerence method is perfectly applied. After constructing 
the control and treatment areas, the average treatment in both groups can be estimated.
　The study suggested that the program has a large eﬀect on the children’s schooling 
compare to the control group. Another ﬁnding of this study found that there was no 
evidence altering the impact of RPS on school enrollment. Indeed, the program had a 
signiﬁcant impact on household food and education expenditure. This impact was primarily 
（　　）
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attributable to the income eﬀects.
　On average, RPS supplemented total annual per capita household expenditures by 18 
percent and most of this increase was spent on food. The program resulted in an average 
increase of 640 Nicaraguan córdobas in annual per capita food expenditures and an 
improvement in the diet of beneﬁciary households. Expenditures on education also 
increased signiﬁcantly, though there was no discernible eﬀect on other types of investment 
expenditures. The economic crisis experienced by these communities during the period 
enabled RPS to operate somewhat like a traditional social safety net, aiding households 
during a downturn.
４．Data and Methodology
４―１　Data
　Our data sources are primarily from the website of the Rand Corporation. This 
institution has conducted surveys four times : in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007. The repeated 
longitudinal survey is a socioeconomic and health survey that is called the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey （IFLS
8）
）.
　The Indonesia Family Life Survey was designed to provide data for studying behaviors 
and outcomes. The survey contains information on wealth collected at the individual and 
household levels and includes multiple indicators of economic and non-economic well-being 
such as consumption, income, assets, education, migration, labor market outcomes, marriage, 
fertility, contraceptive use, health status, use of health care and health insurance, 
relationships among co-resident and non-resident family members, processes underlying 
household decision-making, transfers among family members, and participation in 
community activities.
　In addition to individual and household-level information, IFLS provides detailed 
information on the communities in which IFLS households are located, and the facilities 
that serve residents of those communities. These data cover aspects of the physical and 
social environment, infrastructure, employment opportunities, food prices, access to health 
and educational facilities, and the quality and prices of services available at those facilities
　The Indonesia Family Life Survey is a continuing longitudinal socioeconomic and health 
survey. The survey based on a sample of households that represents about 83％ of the 
Indonesian population living in 13 out of the nation’s 26 provinces in 1993. The survey 
collected data on individual respondents in the households, the communities in which they 
live, and the health and education facilities they use. The ﬁrst wave （IFLS1）, in 1993, 
administers individuals of 7,224 households. IFLS2 sought to re-interview the same 
respondents four years later. The next waves were ﬁelded in 2000 （IFLS3） and 2007 
（IFLS4）. In IFLS4, the numerators tried to re-interview all target households plus 
households that has been moving or new split-oﬀ households that contained at least one 
target respondent. Finally, the number of households increased, becoming 15,145 
（　　）
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households and 66,835 individuals.
　Considering the dynamics of the households during the period from 2000 to 2007, we 
decided to analyze the Raskin program only in one year of cross-sectional data, which is in 
2007 i. e., IFLS 4. We cannot capture the dynamics of the households, such as separated or 
newly married household members, death, birth, children starting to school, graduating or 
dropping out of school, and many more.
　The questionnaires about the Raskin program are mostly covered in Book I （KSR-code）. 
Table 3 summarizes only IFLS4 data about the number of households that answered the 
Raskin program questions. Among 11,092 households that answered the questions, 43.7％ 
or 4,842 households of them participated, while 56.4％ or 6,251 households never 
participated.
　Hastuti and Maxwel （2003） suggested that a subjective decision may occur since the 
ﬁnal decision of beneﬁciaries was determined by the local government and local community 
meeting （mudes）. They argue that the lack of transparency was available in determining 
the participants. We excluded households below the poverty line that did not receive the 
program, but included households above the poverty line that received the program. We 
took this action because the number of sample households below the poverty line in the 
treatment was so small
9）
. If we excluded ineligible households in this group, the estimation 
results might be not accurate. However, the inclusion of these households may cause a self-
selection bias as Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd （1998a ; 1998b） and Bryson, Dorsett, and 
Purdon （2002） suggested.
　In selecting the sample-size for the children’s education expenditure, we excluded 
households that did not have children in school age from 7 to 24 years old and outliers 
based on per capita expenditure and education expenditure. In terms of health expenditure 
outcome, we excluded the outliers in per capita health expenditure
10）
. On the other hand, we 
included all children living in and out of the households that received education 
expenditures from the family.
　We grouped the respondents according to whether they received the program in 2007 or 
not. Households that received the program are referred to as “the treated,” whereas those 
who were not exposed to the program are referred to as “the non-treated.” All these 
selections leave us with 661 households as treated and 1,309 households as the non-treated 
in education outcome, while for health expenditure outcome there are 4,838 households 
and 1,591 households in the non-treated and the treated, respectively （Appendix A and B）.
（　　）
Table 3.　The distribution of respondents
Program
Total Respondent
Number ％
Non-Participant 6,251 56.35
Participant 4,482 43.65
TOTAL 11,092 100 　
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４―２　Methodology and Data Analysis
　The assignment of the Raskin program was purposively determined. Thus, the possibility 
of bias may occur if the treatment has no eﬀect, but the outcomes between two 
comparison groups are diﬀerent because they were not comparable before the treatment 
applied. This potential bias occurs since we only utilize one year’s data set.
４―２―１　Propensity Score Matching
　Rossenbaum and Rubin （1983） introduced a method to overcome this problem. They 
propose a method called propensity score matching （PSM） in order to build a comparison 
group if we do not have the baseline data set.
　Figure 4 explains how to analyze a program impact on the participant if we do not have 
the baseline data. We may obtain the treatment eﬀect of an individual i who participates 
in the program by subtracting the outcome of that individual after the program to his 
outcome when he does not participate. Rubin （1974） states the treatment eﬀect of this 
individual as follows :
　　　　τi＝Yi（1）－Yi（0） ⑴　　
where τ is the eﬀect of the program, Y is the outcome with Ti equals one if he participates 
and zero otherwise. So, the potential outcomes of each individual i is Yi（T）.
　A problem arose because we do not have the baseline data of each individual. Therefore, 
it is impossible to measure the outcome of the same person after the program at the same 
time. In other words, it is impossible to obtain an outcome of the individual by comparing 
it to his own outcome in the post program. The only choice we have is to measure the 
outcome of all participants. This is what Rubin （1974） calls as the Average Treatment on 
the Treated （ATT）.
　Rubin deﬁnes the model of the ATT as follows;
（　　）
Figure 4.　Program Impact Analyses
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　　　　τATT＝Ε（Y1－Y0 | T＝1）＝Ε（Y1 | T＝1）－Ε（Y0 | T＝1） ⑵　　
　Because the outcome of participants before the program― E（Y0 | T＝1）― is unavailable, 
we cannot get the estimated result of the pre-program. In order to estimate the average 
treatment on the treated, we need to ﬁnd a substitute to replace this missing data. The 
substitute that might available is from other units without the program. The units without 
the program will become the counterfactual group of the analyses.
　Constructing a counterfactual group requires a control group that has similar 
characteristics as the treatment group. Therefore, we cannot compare the participants with 
non-participants just as it is, since they mostly have diﬀerent characteristics. The next 
question is how we can construct an ideal comparison group.
　Cochran and Rubin （1973）, Rubin （1979 ; 1997）, Heckman, Hidehiko, and Todd （1997）, 
and Rosenbaum （2002） suggested matching methods to answer that question. The main 
assumption of this method is the ignorable of the treatment assignment. We assume that 
the treatment assignment is randomized. If the treatment is randomized, so the covariates 
are equally distributed for both groups. With this ignorable treatment assignment 
assumption, the balancing score under the observable covariates is suﬃcient to produce an 
unbiased estimation.
　This method suggests that the participation of the households in the program is only 
based on observable covariates. In other words, this method chooses the treatment and 
comparison groups based on similarity of observed characteristics. The similarity of 
characteristics itself are based on a score value of each individual. We can employ the 
probit or the logit method to estimate the score value. After estimating the score value, by 
employing some methods such as nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, and 
stratiﬁcation method, we can get the comparison of the mean outcome of all individuals.
　We found that there was a great deal of observed data of households available in the 
IFLS4. In order to limit it, we only utilized nine covariates of households to estimate the 
score value either in education or in health outcomes. We could not get satisfactory results 
in predicting the score value if we added more variables. In practice, we choose the probit 
method to get the score value of each individual.
　The probit regression model to obtain the score value is as follows :
　　　　Programi＝ β0＋β1Head Agei＋β2HH-Sizei＋β3Male-Headi＋β4Married-Headi＋ 
β5Junior-Headi＋β6Senior-Headi＋β7College-Headi＋ 
β8Employed-Headedi＋β9Urbani＋ei ⑶　　
where β is the value to be estimated, while program is the participation decision with the 
value of one if participated and zero otherwise. All independent variables but age of the 
household’s head and the household’s size are characteristics of the households with binary 
value. The urban variable has a demographic characteristic with value of one if in urban 
areas and zero if in rural areas. After estimating the score value and getting the 
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counterfactual group with the same covariates, we use the nearest neighbor-matching 
estimator to estimate the outcome of the treatment.
４―２―２　The Two-Stage Least Square
　Evaluation of an observational study is usually concerned about two potential biases, e. g., 
overt bias and hidden bias. The former occurs when the units who receive the treatment 
may have diﬀerent characteristics from those in the control group in a way that has been 
measured or recorded, while the latter does when both groups may diﬀer in the way that 
has not been measured or recorded （unobservable）. Considering the important bias 
occurrence, we must take into account this condition in order to get the result consistently.
　Matching method explained above is only dealing with the observed characteristic 
variables. The method may pose a problem if there are unobserved variables that jointly 
aﬀect both the participation program and the outcome. The fact that the program 
participation is purposively determined, i. e., not randomized, causes correlation between 
the error term in the outcome equation and that in the participation equation. This 
participation selection may cause bias in our estimation since the program participation 
becomes endogenous. If we leave the omitted variables in the error term and just run the 
OLS regression, we will get inconsistent estimator results.
　One method to overcome this problem is the two stage linear square （2SLS）. The ﬁrst 
regression is the participation in the program. The second regression is the outcome 
estimation. This method allows us to add additional vectors called instrumental variable in 
the ﬁrst stage regression. Wooldrige （2002
11）
） suggests that instrumental variable is another 
variable that relates either positively or negatively with the exogenous explanatory 
variables. He also suggests that this instrument should be exogenous. Moreover, the 
instrumental variable should relate to participation equation but not to the outcome 
equation. In other words, we should include at least one variable in the ﬁrst stage that is 
an instrumental variable which is uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome 
equation, i. e., ε, but not available in the exogenous explanatory covariates. In this study, 
the participation of the households in the community activities such as improving the 
village, cooperation, community meetings, and voluntary labor will be our instrument.
　We considered picking the participation in the community activities as instrumental 
variables because the local community meeting and the local government decided for the 
households to be the participants. The possibility of a subjective decision might have 
occurred because the budget allocated was not enough to cover all the poor and almost 
poor households.
　Furthermore, in the ﬁrst stage regression, we employed the non-linear binary probit 
participation equation. We calculated its predicted value conditional on instrumental 
variables replacing program participation on the outcome equation and then estimated the 
outcome with the Tobit regression model. We employed the Tobit model in the second 
stage because of the lower bound, zero value, in our dependent variable, zero value. With 
this method, we can overcome the selection bias problem of the dependent variable
12）
. The 
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empirical model of the ﬁrst stage probit estimation is given as follows :
４―２―３　Participation Equation
13）
  :
　　　　Treatedi＝ β0＋β1Head Agei＋β2HH sizei＋β3Male-Headi＋β4Married-Headi＋ 
β6Junior-Headi＋β7Senior-Headi＋β8College-Headi＋β9Junior-Spousei＋
β10Tertiary-Spousei＋β11College-Spousei＋β12Urbani＋β13Imprv. villgei＋
β14Cooprationi＋β15Comm. Meetingi＋β16Volluntary Labori＋vi ⑷　　
　In this ﬁrst stage regression, we only obtain the predicted value that assumed the 
probability of program participation in the second equation. The treated variable, the 
participation variable with a value of one for participated and zero otherwise, is no longer 
in our second equation. It is replaced by a participation variable （Program）, which is the 
predicted value of the ﬁrst stage. By constructing this method, the correlation between the 
error term and other independent variables has been minimized. The Tobit method in the 
second equation treats the zero expenditure as a left censored that equals to zero. This 
method assumed the εI’s is to be independently and normally distributed : εi ～ N（0，σ） 
（Tobin, 1958）. Meanwhile, the empirical model of the second stage for the outcome 
regression is as follows :
４―２―４　Outcome Equation :
　　　　Outcomei＝ ∂0＋∂1Programi＋∂2Head-Agei＋∂3HH-Sizei＋∂4Male-Headi＋ 
∂5Married-Headi＋∂6Employed-Headi＋∂7Junior-Headi＋ 
∂8Senior-Headi＋∂10Junior-Spousei＋∂11Senior-Spousei＋ 
∂12College-Spousei＋∂13Urbani＋εI ⑸　　
where ∂ is the value to be estimated, outcome is our dependent variable, i. e. education 
expenditure and health expenditure, and the variable Program refers to probability of 
program participation. Other explanatory variables are households and demographic 
characteristics.
５．Empirical Analysis
５―１　Estimation of Education Expenditure
５―１―１　The Propensity Score Matching （PSM） Estimation
　We employed the nearest matching method to estimate the eﬀect of the Raskin program 
on the education expenditure because this method is the most commonly used （La Londe, 
1986 ; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 ; 2002 ; Diaz and Handa, 2004）.
　The nearest-neighbor matching method compares a single unit of the treated to each 
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unit of the non-treated with the closest propensity score. In this method, the closest 
characteristic was depicted by the propensity score value. The purpose of PSM estimation 
was to estimate the average treatment on the treated （ATT）.
　Before obtaining the ATT estimation, we predicted the propensity score by running the 
probit regression method. In this step, our estimation resulted in six blocks. This implies 
that the estimation of the propensity score’s mean was not diﬀerent in each block. Table 4 
shows that the number of respondents in each group corresponds to their propensity 
score.
　From the units available in each block, we estimated the ATT by subtracting their 
mean of outcomes. Moreover, we used the bootstrapping option up to 1,000 times to obtain 
the standard error （Table 4）. From 1,257 individuals in the non-treated, we obtained 535 
individuals as the control to 661 units in the treated. This estimation referred to the actual 
nearest neighbor matches.
　With the standard error 0.18 and t-value －1.188 of estimation （Table 5）, the negative 
result was not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. Therefore, we 
may not reject the null hypothesis that the program did not aﬀect the education 
expenditure. More speciﬁcally, with PSM estimation, we may not conclude that on the 
average the beneﬁciaries had reduced their education expenditure if they participated in 
the program.
５―１―２　The Two-Stage Linear Squares Estimation
　The empirical result of the 2SLS method in estimating the education expenditure is 
presented in Table 6. Before we had the results, we regressed the ﬁrst stage using the 
probit method. By using the probit method in the ﬁrst stage, we utilized four instrumental 
（　　）
Table 4.　The inferior bound by Program
Inferior of
block of pscore Non-Treated Treated Total
0.0311011 270 15 285
0.1　　　 294 60 354
0.2　　　 284 114 398
0.4　　　 355 372 727
0.6　　　 53 98 151
0.8　　　 1 2 3
Total 1257 661 1918
Table 5.　The ATT estimation with the Nearest Neighbor Matching method
Treated Control ATT Std. error t
661 535 －0.213 0.18 －1.188
1000 bootsrapped standard errors
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variable derived from the participation of households in community activities. After testing 
the weak instrument, we provide the result of the ﬁrst stage estimation in Appendix C.
　We tested the weak instrumental variable by using the likelihood ratio, Anderson-Rubin 
and Lagrange Multiplier method. Under the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level, except for the 
Anderson-Rubin, we rejected the null hypothesis that the beta value of the program 
variable was not diﬀerent from zero.
　The Tobit method was employed in the second stage because our dependent variable 
has the censored data observation, i. e., zero value. The main assumption of the Tobit 
method is that the decision to purchase and how much to purchase is solely based on the 
individual’s preference. Furthermore, all coeﬃcients explain the eﬀect of an independent 
variable on the education expenditure per child.
　However, we will not interpret the ﬁrst stage estimation of this study because we just 
have to get the predicted value of this estimation in order to eliminate the endogenous 
（　　）
Table 6.　Tobit Estimation and Marginal Eﬀects of Education Expenditure 
Variables
Education Expenditure per School-Child
Tobit Marginal Eﬀects UnconditionalExpected Value
Marginal Eﬀects Conditional
on Being Uncensored
Program 200,505＊＊＊
（90,409）　
193,584 170,404
HH Size －22,935＊＊＊
（3,971）　
－22,143 －19,492
Head Age 5,285＊＊＊
（540）　
5,102 4,491
Male Headed 81,496＊＊＊
（46,831）　
78,683 69,261
Married Headed －116,436＊＊＊
（55,114）　
－112,417 －98,955
Employed-Head －50,927＊＊＊
（14,115）　
－49,169 －43,281
Junior Head 57,197＊＊＊
（18,257）　
55,223 48,610
Senior Head 113,306＊＊＊
（26,975）　
109,395 96,295
College Head 218,248＊＊＊
（34,508）　
210,715 185,413
Junior Spouse 41,456＊＊＊
（16,763）　
40,025 35,232
Senior Spouse 53,679＊＊＊
（20,579）　
51,827 45,621
College-Spouse 106,076＊＊＊
（27,461）　
102,415 90.151
Urban 39,714＊＊＊
（10,805）　
38,343 33,752
Constant －77,200＊＊＊
（42,002）　
― ―
Sigma 208,789  　 ― ―
Observations 1,970  　 ― ―
Signiﬁcance level at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 for＊ , ＊＊ and＊＊＊ respectively
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard error
Marginal eﬀects was estimated by using dtobit2 in Stata.11
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problem of the program in the outcome estimation. We use the predicted value of the ﬁrst 
stage as replacing the program in the second estimation.
　In order to explain the estimation of Tobit method, we need to examine the marginal 
eﬀects of each variable. Table 6 provides the maximum likelihood estimation with the 
marginal eﬀects of an unconditional expected value and the marginal eﬀects of dependent 
on being uncensored, i. e., except zero value. All the marginal eﬀects are conditional on 
education expenditure per child and calculated by the means of the independent variable. 
The interpretation of each variable is that an increase of the independent variable will 
aﬀect the dependent variable for some amount, holding other variables constant at their 
means. Moreover, the marginal eﬀect of the unconditional expected value is the average 
expenditure for all observations while the marginal eﬀect of the conditional of being 
uncensored is for the observation above zero. Now, we will explain all variables based on 
the marginal eﬀects in order.
　The ﬁrst column shows that under the 5％ signiﬁcant level the program shows a highly 
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the education expenditure. The second column implies that on average 
all participants have higher expenditure on education, about 193,584 rupiah, compared to 
non-participants. In addition, the uncensored participants increased their education 
expenditure about 170,404 rupiah if they participated in the program.
　In general, the household and socio demographic variables show signiﬁcant results. The 
household’s size is statistically signiﬁcant as expected. The negative sign means that the 
education expenditure decreases as the family size increases. The marginal eﬀects of 
unconditional expected value explain that any additional member in the household will 
decrease the education expenditure of all respondents on average about 22,143 rupiah. In 
addition, with respect to the increasing family size, the uncensored respondent decreases 
its education expenditure about 19,492 rupiah.
　The age of the head of the household has the opposite sign of the family size. This 
variable is highly signiﬁcant as expected at 1％ level. The result of the household’s gender 
variable shows a positive signiﬁcance at 10％ level. On average, all respondents increase 
their education expenditure about 78,683 rupiah if the head of the household is male, 
cateris paribus.
　The signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient of married-headed household is contrary to our 
expected results. We were a bit surprised to ﬁnd that the sign of working-headed 
household was similar to the married-headed household. This result is contrary to our 
expected result, as in general lower income relates to unemployment status.
　The education level of the household’s head and spouse show that this variable is so 
important to education expenditure. All levels of education are positive sign and are 
increasing. This was similar to the education level of the spouse.
　The last variable shows that households that live in urban areas have more expenditure 
on education compared to the households that live in rural areas. This may be due to the 
fact that education facilities are better in urban areas than in rural areas （Tansel, 1998, 
and Kim and Lee, 2001）.
（　　）
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５―２　Estimation of the Health Expenditure
　In the health expenditure estimation, we used the same methodology of analysis as the 
education expenditure. We employed the PSM method to estimate the eﬀect of the Raskin 
program in the health expenditure. With the same control variables from the household 
and demographic characteristics, we could not meet satisfactory matching levels, as the 
education expenditure did.
５―２―１　The Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
　Like in the previous outcome, we are also concerned with the endogenous program in 
the estimation. Table 7 presents the marginal eﬀects at the observed censoring rate. We 
will interpret the marginal eﬀects on the unconditional expected value and on the 
conditional of being uncensored. The ﬁrst marginal eﬀect refers to the average value of 
how the variable aﬀects the outcome. This average value is from all respondents, including 
（　　）
Table 7.　Tobit Estimation and Marginal Eﬀects for the Health Expenditure
Variables
Health Expenditure
Tobit Marginal Eﬀects UnconditionalExpected Value
Marginal Eﬀects Conditional
on Being Uncensored
Program －20,568  　
（36,367） 　
－18,040 －13,925
HH Size 7,458＊＊＊
（1,620） 　
6,541 5,049
Head Age 1,009＊＊＊
（162） 　
885 683
Male Headed －33,249＊＊＊
（8,347） 　
－29,163 －22,511
Married Headed 28,431＊＊＊
（8,517） 　
24,938 19,249
Employed-Head 14,123＊＊＊
（5,719） 　
12,387 9,562
Junior Head 10,860  　
（8,067） 　
9,525 7,352
Senior Head 16,809  　
（10,438） 　
14,743 11,380
College Head 28,581＊＊＊
（12,838） 　
25,069 19,351
Junior Spouse 7,839  　
（8,012） 　
6,876 5,307
Senior Spouse 17,313＊＊＊
（7,879） 　
15,186 11,722
College-Spouse 44,030＊＊＊
（10,814） 　
38,620 29,811
Urban 12,729＊＊＊
（5,462） 　
11,164 8,618
Constant －63,104＊＊＊
（15,294） 　
― ―
Sigma 169,932  　 ― ―
Observations 6,429  　 ― ―
Signiﬁcant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 for＊ , ＊＊ and＊＊＊ respectively
Numbers in parentheses are standard error
The Marginal Eﬀects are estimated by dtobit2 in Stata.11
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censored data. On the other hand, the latter marginal eﬀect refers to the eﬀects of 
variables which belong to uncensored units in the dependent variable. Now, we will explain 
all the independent variables in order.
　The ﬁrst column of the table shows that the program has a negative sign, but is 
statistically insigniﬁcant. We may say that the program does not appear to be associated 
with the increase of health expenditure. In other word, with the negative sign estimation 
we may not conclude that the program reduces the health expenditure of participant. 
Moreover, the unclear result is probably due to the condition that health expenditure is 
unpredictable. Therefore, the health expenditure is less likely to be a regular cost.
　Unlike the education expenditure, the family size has a positive eﬀect on health 
expenditure as expected. This variable implies that health expenditure increases along with 
the additional family member. The unconditional expected value is about 6,541 rupiah, 
which means that on average the respondents increase their health expenditure for 
additional members of the household. On the other hand, the uncensored respondents 
spend 5,049 rupiah on health as the size of the household increases. The eﬀect of the head 
of the household’s age is positively signiﬁcant at 1％ level. This implies that as the head of 
the household’s age increases, the health expenditure increases as well. This ﬁnding is 
similar to Meng and Yeo （2005） who argued that in developing countries with undeveloped 
health systems, the older the head of the household, the higher the expenditure on health.
　Female-headed households seem likely to spend more on health expenditure than the 
male-headed households. The negatively signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of dummy male-headed at 1
％ implies that the female-headed households pay more for the quality of their children 
than the male-headed households. This result is as expected and similar to other studies. 
The interpretation for unconditional marginal eﬀects is, on average, the male-headed 
respondents spend less on health expenditure by about 29,163 rupiah than the female-
headed households. On the other hand, the uncensored female-headed households are more 
likely to spend more on health expenditure by about 22,511 rupiah than male-headed 
households.
　Marital status seems important to the health expenditure of households. The estimated 
coeﬃcient is positively signiﬁcant at 5％ level as expected. It implies that married-headed 
households are more likely to spend more on the health expenditure than single-headed 
households. This result is the opposite of the education outcome.
　Furthermore, the head of the household having a job signiﬁcantly contributes to the 
health expenditure. This is true because the main variable aﬀecting health expenditure is 
income. To interpret the result, the heads of household who are working on average spend 
more on the health expenditure by about 12,387 compared to the heads of household who 
are not working. On the other side, the uncensored heads of household who are working 
spend more on health expenditure, about 9,562 compared to the uncensored heads of 
household who are not working.
　The college levels of the households’ heads shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect, which indicates 
that there is no evidence that less educated heads of household aﬀect health expenditure. 
（　　）
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In other words, the college level of the heads of household is the only variable that aﬀects 
health expenditure. It is not similar to the spouses’ level of education. This variable is 
positively signiﬁcant if the spouses are in the senior level of education and above.
　In general, an urban residence does aﬀect health expenditure compared to its 
counterpart. This result is similar to our expectation. A possible reason for this is that 
more health service choices with modern facilities are available in urban areas. In addition, 
households that live in rural areas are farther from the nearest health service. Moreover, 
according to a BPS survey in 2007, the main obstacle of households living in rural areas to 
access health services was income level, as well as availability of transportation and health 
service.
６．Conclusion and Policy Implication
６―１　Conclusion
　This study intends to analyze whether the Raskin program aﬀected the expenditure of 
the participants, especially on education and health. Using the IFLS household data from 
the Rand Corporation, i. e., IFLS4 （2007）, and employing the non-parametric and the semi-
parametric approaches, this paper examines the contribution of the Raskin program to the 
expenditures of education and health.
　Even though the data before 2007 are available （1993, 1997, and 2000）, we only utilize 
the data in 2007 because we cannot capture the dynamics of the household such as death, 
newborn, newly married or separated, and many more. Therefore, we used the PSM 
method with the assumption that there is no baseline data. On the other hand, we 
employed the 2SLS method at the same time because we were concerned with the 
endogenous problem of the program.
　The estimation results explain that the program does aﬀect the participants’ expenditure 
on education, but not their health expenditure. This means that if the respondent 
participates in the program, he may increase his expenditure on education. This ﬁnding 
supports our hypothesis that the program contributed to education expenditure. However, 
we may not say that the program has impacted health expenditure because the estimated 
result is insigniﬁcant. One possible reason is that health expenditure is more likely a non-
regular or unpredictable expenditure （David, 1993）.
　Relatively, all the households and demographic characteristics have signiﬁcant and 
expected results except for the working head in the education outcome. These variable 
results are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. A possible explanation is that the 
households’ head who were not working exploited their saving or wealth since they 
considered education to be important and they did not want their children to have a 
similar hardship in the future. However, we need further observation to discover the 
reason for our results.
　Overall, all variables, such as lower income, less educated parents, higher number of 
（　　）
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members of households, and living in rural area, demonstrate the general characteristics of 
poor households. These factors relatively aﬀect the participation in the program and the 
expenditure on education and health. Most importantly, the fact that higher-educated 
parents have spent more on education and health expenditure demonstrates that parents 
focus more attention on the quality of their children.
６―２　Suggestion and Policy Implication
　The government of Indonesia has implemented the Raskin program with some 
characteristics for more than ten years. First, some ineligible households were exposed to 
the program, while some eligible households did not participate in the program, even 
though in general the participants were from the middle-income households. Regarding this 
condition, the government and NGOs should pay close attention to the process of targeting 
the beneﬁciaries. In addition, the poverty line used was still below 1.5 USD per capita per 
day, indicating that the method of targeting the beneﬁciaries did not describe the actual 
conditions of the poor households. Therefore, the method of 2,100 kilocalories consumption 
plus the non-food consumption should be improved by adding more food and non-food 
items as part of the estimation. All in all, the basic consumption per capita is close to the 
reality.
　Second, the function of the Raskin program is not only for food security but also for 
redistribution income. The study revealed that its function as income has aﬀected the 
education expenditure of the participants, even though the amount of the subsidy was still 
below the daily consumption. This contribution is not to health expenditure, because the 
health expenditure is more likely non-regular or unpredictable expenditure.
　Parents consider education to be important for their children. Considering this, the 
government should support the fact that parents spend more of their expenditures on 
education. If it is possible, the government should provide education that is free of charge, 
with scholarships and other similar programs for the children of needy households.
　Most of the participant heads of household worked. On the other hand, the study shows 
that non-working headed households spent more on education than those who were 
working-headed households. The possible explanation is that parents exploited their wealth 
for their children’s education. Unfortunately, this behavior may cause other problems. 
Therefore, the government should implement other programs that generate income and 
create employment opportunities （Thwala, 2006）.
　Furthermore, providing programs empowering the spouse is also an alternative for poor 
households. Nowadays, empowering women through microcredit becomes popular in many 
developing countries. It is obvious that the low-level income households do not have access 
to credit. Therefore, providing loans to poor households is one solution to generate income. 
Many studies have proved that microcredit for the poor generated signiﬁcant eﬀects on 
the economy of poor households （Latifee, 2003 ; ADB, 2007）.
　The BPS data shows that the households’ expenditures on health are increasing. 
Meanwhile, our study reveals that the older the head of the household. the more the 
（　　）
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expenditure on health. Therefore, the government should think of a way for poor people to 
get qualiﬁed health care without exploiting their wealth. Meng and Yeo （2005） suggested 
that in rural China with an undeveloped insurance system, elderly people tend to spend 
more on health. This indicates that providing health insurance for needy households at an 
early age should be a compulsory. If young people can access qualiﬁed health care, the 
possibility of better health outcomes is increased （Trujillo, Portillo, and Vernon, 2005 ; 
Martin, Rice, and Smith, 2007）. Thus, elderly people can avoid depleting their wealth when 
they are old.
　All of the programs suggested above rely on government spending. Other sectors that 
need improvement will lack of spending if the government allocates most of the budget for 
these kinds of programs. Therefore, accelerating economic growth could be another solution 
to alleviate poverty.
　Moreover, human quality development will increase the skills of the people in the future, 
since most households already consider education and health to be important for their 
children. Education may increase the skills of workers, while health may increase the 
productivity of workers. These outcomes become incentive to attract more invesment. 
Furthermore, the higher the investment, the more likely the unemployment rate will 
decrease. On the other hand, the higher the skills and productivity of employers, the 
higher the income they can earn. This implies that people that are more educated and 
healthier can earn a higher income, which will raise their economic status.
６―３　Future Discussion
　Program impact evaluation for the poor can yield a better result if we have the baseline 
data set. If we only use cross-section data, we cannot analyze the dynamics of the 
households. In other words, it is impossible to distinguish households who are living in the 
poverty status before and after the program, and which households were able to move out 
of poverty after the program.
　Moreover, we employed the PSM method, which does not give clear-cut results. This 
could be because of the bias caused by self-selection bias or hidden bias in this study. 
Another possible explanation is that the study uses the comparison group from the same 
data source. In addition to that, we can also consider including more variables, with some 
possibility of variable interaction, and using other methods to get comparative results.
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1）　1 USD＝Rp. 9,000.00.
2）　These contents are derived from the Bureau Central Statistic of Indonesia : Demographic and 
Health Survey 2007.
3）　One can see the complete data at www. bps. go. id.
4）　The Governor of DKI Jakarta Regulation No. 93/2007 on Operational Guidelines on Rice for 
Poor Family Program （RASKIN） in 2007.
5）　These contents are derived from the Ministry of Finance letter No : 117/PMK. 02/2007 on 
BULOG Budget Related to Stock and Distribution Management and Rice Price Stabilization.
6）　These contents are derived from the Law No. 2/1989 and Law No. 20/2003 on National 
Education System in Indonesia.
7）　These contents are derived from the Socio and Demographic Health Census 2003, BPS.
8）　All this information is derived heavily from IFLS4 : Overview and Filed Report. pp. 1―18.
9）　The sample size below the poverty line that received the program was 77 households out of 
661 households in the education outcome and 141 households out of 1,591 households in the 
health outcome.
10）　We also applied the outliers exclusion based on 95 percent conﬁdence level after estimating 
the predicted value.
11）　The deeper explanation can be seen in Wooldrige （2002） : Econometric analysis of cross 
section and panel data. pp. 209―220.
12）　The deeper explanation about the Tobit method can be seen in Cameron and Trivedi. 
（2005） : Microeconometrics : Methods and Applications. pp. 536―544.
13）　We used Stata.11 to utilize the raw data in all regression estimations.
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Appendix A.　Descriptive Statistics of Variables used to analyze HH expenditure on school
Variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Non-Treated Treated All Non-Treated Treated ALL
Edu Expend / Child 202,315 99,356 167,769 251,00 123,807 221,161
Treated 1 0 0.33 1 0 0.47
Age of HH Head 43.58 43.31 43.50 9.46 10.5 9.81
HH Size 4.39 4.65 4.48 1.53 1.73 1.60
Male HH Head 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.31 0.37 0.33
Married HH Head 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.32 0.27 0.31
Junior HH Head 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.34 0.37 0.35
Senior HH Head 0.34 0.14 0.27 0.47 0.34 0.44
College HH Head 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.40 0.15 0.35
Junior Spouse 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.36 0.34 0.36
Senior Spouse 0.26 0.08 0.20 0.44 0.28 0.40
College Spouse 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.33 0.11 0.28
Working HH Head 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.43 0.39 0.41
Urban Area 0.62 0.43 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.49
Cooperation 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.20
Improv. Village 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.45 0.48 0.47
Voluntary Labor 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.48
Comm. Meeting 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.48 0.48
Observations 1,309 661 1,970 1,309 661 1,970
Appendix B.　Descriptive Statistics of Variables to Analyze Health Expenditure of Households
Variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Non-Treated Treated All Non-Treated Treated ALL
Health Expenditure 54,654 30,408 48,654 171,275 114,162 159,358
Age of HH Head 41.60 47.18 42.98 14.88 15.05 15.11
HH Size 3.44 3.91 3.56 1.78 1.77 1.79
Male HH Head 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.37 0.41 0.38
Married HH Head 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.42 0.36 0.41
Junior HH Head 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.37 0.36
Senior HH Head 0.22 0.17 0.28 0.41 0.32 0.45
College HH Head 0.20 0.01 0.14 0.40 0.12 0.35
Junior Spouse 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.39 0.29 0.30
Senior Spouse 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.41 0.26 0.38
College Spouse 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.29 0.12 0.26
Working HH Head 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.44 0.41 0.43
Urban Area 0.65 0.42 0.59 0.47 0.49 0.49
Cooperation 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.17
Improv. Village 0.21 0.32 0.23 0.47 0.46 0.42
Voluntary Labor 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.44 0.47 0.45
Comm. Meeting 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.44
Observations 4,838 1,591 6,429 4,838 1,591 6,429
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Appendix C.　Probit estimation of participation equation
Variables
Education Expenditure per Child Health Expenditure
All All
HH Size 0.9177
＊＊＊
（0.0213） 　
0.0851＊＊＊
（0.0111） 　
Head Age －0.0053  　（0.0035） 　
0.0037＊＊＊
（0.0014） 　
Male Headed －1.6980
＊＊＊
（0.2420） 　
0.5683＊＊＊
（0.0683） 　
Married Headed 1.8532
＊＊＊
（0.2484） 　
0.4152＊＊＊
（0.0699） 　
Employed-Head 0.2953
＊＊＊
（0.0840） 　
0.2051＊＊＊
（0.0475） 　
Junior Head －0.3302
＊＊＊
（0.0932） 　
0.3336＊＊＊
（0.0533） 　
Senior Head －0.7632
＊＊＊
（0.9444） 　
0.7881＊＊＊
（0.0564） 　
College Head －1.2117
＊＊＊
（0.1586） 　
1.3442＊＊＊
（0.1022） 　
Junior Spouse －0.19489
＊＊　
（0.9711） 　
－0.1226＊＊＊
（0.0650） 　
Senior Spouse －0.4382
＊＊＊
（0.1113） 　
0.3180＊＊＊
（0.0657） 　
College-Spouse －0.7847
＊＊＊
（0.2018） 　
0.6188＊＊＊
（0.1269） 　
Imprv. Village 0.2141
＊＊＊
（0.0742） 　
0.2702＊＊＊
（0.0450） 　
Cooperation －0.2076  　（0.1785） 　
－0.1888  　
（0.1187） 　
Comm. Meeting 0.0704  　（0.7148） 　
0.1740＊＊＊
（0.0450） 　
Voltary Labor 0.1005  　（0.0730） 　
0.0774＊＊＊
（0.0451） 　
Urban －0.1361
＊＊＊
（0.0677） 　
0.2556＊＊＊
（0.0392） 　
Constant －0.5651  　 0.7513＊＊＊
Observations 1,970 6,249
Signiﬁcant level at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 for＊ , ＊＊ and＊＊＊ respectively
Numbers in parentheses are standard error
The Predicted Value is assumed to be Program in the 2nd Estimation
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